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21. Introduction
Prior to the emergence of global climate change, the Great Depression was arguably the 
biggest market failure in the history of the United States. It was a catastrophe not just because 
of the economic chaos and hardship it produced but because it threatened the liberty that was 
fundamental to American democracy. The rise of Nazi and Fascist regimes in Western Europe 
showed, according to Franklin Delano Roosevelt, that if private power grew to a point where 
it became stronger than the state, a democracy’s liberty was threatened. The subservience of 
government to a private power was fascism. Democracy was also threatened whenever the 
business system did not enough employment and an acceptable standard of living. These 
dangers, he claimed, both confronted the United States.
Among us today a concentration of private power without equal in history is growing.
This concentration is seriously impairing the economic effectiveness of private 
enterprise as a way of providing employment for labor and capital and as a way of 
assuring a more equitable distribution of income and earnings among the people of 
the Nation as a whole. (FDR to Congress, April 29, 1938,  (United States, Temporary 
National Economic Committee 1938), p. 185)
The letter to Congress in which he made this assessment went on to document the increase in 
the concentration of income and wealth that had taken place during the depression, arguing 
that increased industrial concentration threatened the competition on which the free-
enterprise system depended. He clearly had Germany in mind when he went on to write, 
“Private enterprise is ceasing to be free enterprise and is becoming a cluster of private 
3collectivisms; masking itself as a system of free enterprise after the American model, it is in 
fact becoming a concealed cartel system after the European model” (ibid., p. 186). Unless the 
concentration of economic power could be reversed, American democracy, resting on a 
foundation of liberty, was in grave danger.
Roosevelt may not have used the language of market failure but it would have been an 
apt label for his diagnosis of the problem still facing the United States after almost a decade 
of depression. His view that markets had failed was long standing (see  (Stabile, & Kozak 
2012), Chapter 8) but these ideas reflected a substantial literature that on the limitations of 
markets that had developed in the 1920s and 1930s. This literature, generally focusing on the 
way American business had evolved in the late-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, 
contended that the competitive conditions required for markets to work well no longer 
prevailed, and during the 1930s these ideas were adduced as explanations of the Great 
Depression and the inability of traditional, market-based policies to solve the problem.
One reading of this literature is that was doing no more than provide a explanation of 
why prices were inflexible—the “classical” theory of depression criticized by John Maynard 
Keynes in The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money ( (Keynes 1972)). 
However, it is very misleading to bracket this literature with the “classical” view attacked by 
Keynes, for it was rooted in American institutionalism and came with no bias towards laissez-
faire. Price inflexibility was incidental to this literature, the main concern of which was with 
the functioning of large corporations and the markets in which they operated, and the 
structural problems this created for market organization. The story told here is of how this 
literature, in which market failure was associated with monopoly power, came to be melded 
with ideas about the failure of what Roosevelt called the financial machine to equilibrate 
saving and investment: about how how institutionalists came to adopt a more Keynesian 
4perspective on the cause of the Great Depression. The outcome was thus the emergence of an 
American Keynesianism with institutionalist roots.  Concern with monopoly power did not 
disappear but it came to be associated with industrial economics rather than with what 
increasingly came to be considered macroeconomic problems.   The institutionalist literature 
did, however, leave a mark on postwar Keynesian macroeconomics in that it was widely 
taken for granted that competition was imperfect, in clear contradiction to the position taken 
by Keynes.  
This paper outlines these theories as they were developed in the academic literature and 
as they were drawn upon in a major inquiry, authorized by the letter from Roosevelt to 
Congress from which the above quotation is taken. It then traces some of the ways in which 
this literature, though it was eclipsed by Keynes’s competing vision of the market failure that 
led to the depression, nonetheless fed through into postwar economics. It fed directly into the 
literature on industrial organization, in which Joe Bain and the architects of what came to be 
known as the Harvard school attempted to analyze the relationship between market structure 
and economic performance. The Chicago  attacks on the Harvard school, associated with 
George Stigler, developed a perspective on industrial policy that began as a critique of the 
institutionalist literature. The link with postwar macroeconomics is less direct, but it can be 
seen in the widespread practice of justifying reverse-L shaped aggregate supply curves with 
an account of oligopolistic price setting. The paper illustrates this using the textbook that, 
above all others, came to be linked with American  Keynesianism—Paul Samuelson’s 
Economics—which drew to an extent not generally recognized, on the institutionalist 
literature discussed in this paper.
The story told here is not completely new. Rutherford ( (Rutherford 2011), chapter 10) 
has drawn attention to the complexity of the institutionalist response to Keynes, drawing 
5attention to the divide between those institutionalists who blamed depression on business 
profit-making and those who adopted underconsumptionist explanations (ibid., p. 291, n. 5); 
and the story parallels and overlaps with the one told by Lee ( (Lee 1990)) in relation to the 
National Resources Committee. Similarly Mehrling ( (1997))  has pointed out that Hansen’s 
“conversion” came when he saw how he could accommodate certain Keynesian ideas within 
his earlier conception of the business cycle. However, such work has not drawn out the 
implication of this episode for thinking about the concept of market failure.
2. Questioning competitive markets, the 1920s
In the United States there is a long tradition of concern with the dangers posed by 
monopolies and cartels. This was reflected in the passage of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act 
(1890), which made it illegal to attempt to create a monopoly in interstate or international 
trade, and the Clayton Act (1914) which amended the Sherman Act through making illegal 
specific practices through which this was achieved (price discrimination, exclusive dealing 
contracts, mergers between competing companies, and interlocking directorates). This 
legislation and its use against perceived monopolies was a significant part of the background 
against which economists discussed the operation of markets in after the First World War.
One of the most significant books to emerge during the 1920s was Frank Knight’s Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profit ( (1921)). This book is best known for its distinction between risk and 
uncertainty, and for its having offered a rigorous account of the conditions necessary for 
perfect competition. Knight’s motivation for developing the theory of perfect competition 
was to show that the pre-requisites for perfect competition, and hence the traditional theory of 
6value, to be valid were not satisfied in the real world. The most important of these 
assumptions was perfect knowledge and a large part of his book was devoted to exploring the 
implications of uncertainty. This took him into dynamics, for in a world in which there was 
no change, then there was unlikely to be much uncertainty. 
A lot of Knight’s book was theoretical, dealing with abstract and even philosophical 
ideas. However, his concern was with how markets worked, for he wanted “to isolate and 
define the essential characteristics of free enterprise as a system or method of securing and 
directing cooperative effort in a social group” ( (Knight 1921), p. viii). Knight claimed that 
his book “probably” emphasized the defects of free enterprise, but before concluding that any 
other system was better, it was necessary to examine alternative forms of social organization. 
The only conclusion to which he admitted was that “In the ultimate society, no doubt, every 
conceivable type of organization machinery will find its place” (ibid., p. ix). Markets have 
problems but so too might other forms of social organization.
Whereas the fundamental problem for Knight was uncertainty, John Maurice Clark 
( (Clark 1923)), who had helped Knight turn his thesis into a book, took a different view. For 
him the fundamental problem was “overhead costs”—those costs that cannot be attributed to 
specific units of output and which businesses have to incur irrespective of the quantity of 
goods they produce. This undermined traditional views about markets because, as Clark 
( (Clark 1923), p. 32) put it, “There is no natural system of prices in the old sense. Cost prices 
do not mean anything definite any more.” In other words, the existence of overhead costs 
meant that supply and demand did not determine unique prices, and prices did not correspond 
either to the cost of producing goods or to the value of goods to consumers: they varied over 
the business cycle according to the level of prosperity (ibid., Chapter XXIII). Competition 
7served to reduce price differentials but it did not eliminate them completely. Because of this, 
decisions had to be made about how overhead costs should be apportioned, raising questions 
about how objectives of efficiency, incentives and fairness were to be balanced against each 
other.
The implication was that competition was “a varied and elastic thing” (ibid., p. 461):
Competition is necessarily a thing of self-imposed restraints, governed by the 
folkways of the business community even more actively and consciously than by the 
underlying restraints imposed by government. … Agreements, understandings and the 
sentiment against “spoiling the market” all play a part in restraining competition, and 
are limited in their turn by some of the various forms of potential competition. Some 
of the forces of potential competition do not begin to act until the earnings of the 
capital engaged in the business are materially above the minimum rate necessary to 
attract free capital; while some of the forces of active competition continue to act even 
after prices are below the level necessary to cover operating expenses.
Clark argued that these were not merely imperfections in the market but were “essential to its 
‘normal’ operation” (ibid., p. 460). He even included government expenses in the overhead 
costs industry had to bear, for government furnishes “vital, if intangible, factors of 
production; and produces far more than it costs” (ibid., p. 463).
Though making no assumption about the number of firms—he claimed to be presenting 
a general theory of competitive processes—Clark saw competitive markets as characterized 
by the type of indeterminacy usually attributed to oligopoly. Mechanical forces of supply and 
demand did not determine prices, but merely determined the constraints within which human 
8psychology would operate. Markets would not equate supply and demand for there were 
times when both labor and capital were idle.
In times of depression, prices of goods and rates of wages do not come down to the 
point where demand for the ultimate factors of production would be equal to supply. 
They are pegged at higher levels which hard back to the more active times which 
trade has enjoyed, and hopes to enjoy again. There is a sag, but it is like the sag of a 
rope stretched across a chasm, and does not reach bottom. These sustaining forces 
take varied forms … especially in connection with the ultimate costs of labor, and cut-
throat competition. ( (Clark 1923), p. 465)
The reference to cut-throat competition, alluding to his arguments about how businessmen 
normally sought to avoid such potentially ruinous practices, makes it clear that he was not 
simply alleging that wages were sticky. They might be sticky but this was an inherent feature 
of competition in a world where prices had to be significantly greater than variable costs if 
firms were to survive.
The result of this was that markets might break down—they might fail. The economic 
system, involving an endless process of learning through trial and error, was “the very 
opposite of fool-proof”: “it requires nothing short of superhuman qualities of vision, 
foresight, correlation and co-operation to make it work without disastrous break-
downs” ( (Clark 1923), p. 480). This raised questions for democracy, for democracy required 
that this “superhuman vision … must be grasped by the many and this correlation must be 
democratically conceived and brought into being” (ibid.).
9Edward Chamberlin’s Theory of Monopolistic Competition ( (1933)), like Knight’s 
book originally a thesis supervised by Allyn Young, was published in the midst of the Great 
Depression but its conception was in the 1920s, for the thesis on which it was based had been 
submitted to Harvard 1927. His starting point was the claim that economists, among whom 
he cited Knight and Clark, were confused about perfect competition. The reason for their 
confusion, he argued, was that “supposedly perfect competition is really 
imperfect” ( (Chamberlin 1933) , p. 4). He set out to construct a synthesis of the theories of 
monopoly and perfect competition, ending up with a complex theory of market structure. 
Markets could be distinguished according to the number of sellers but account also had to be 
taken on product differentiation and selling costs, such as advertising. Chamberlin was trying 
to create an economic theory appropriate for the modern world in which these were central 
phenomena of business activity. His search was for a more realistic theory. “Competitive 
theory,” he argued, “is unreal in large part because it fails truly to represent the forces at work 
in the economic system” ( (Chamberlin 1933), p. 176).
A more radical appraisal of markets, that was published after Chamberlin’s thesis, 
though before his book, was The Modern Corporation and Private Property ( (Berle, & 
Means 1932)). In the course of differentiating between different sources of income—the 
returns for providing capital, managing a business, and bearing risk and uncertainty—Knight 
had drawn a clear distinction between management and ownership of business. In a project 
funded by the Social Science Research Council, launched in 1928, not long before the height 
of the stock market boom that preceded the Great Crash, but published only after the world 
had moved into depression, a lawyer, Adolf Berle, and an economist, Gardiner Means 
developed the idea that ownership and management were different into a critique of the 
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market system as it had evolved in the United States. The corporation, they argued, was both 
a way of holding property and a means whereby economic life was organized. It permitted 
the concentration of wealth and its control by a small number of people—the managers of 
large corporations. Investors had surrendered control over their wealth and had “effectively 
broken the old property relationships and has raised the problem of defining these 
relationships anew” ( (Berle, & Means 1932), p. 2). They documented the  history of the 
corporation and the concentration of economic power that had taken place. Even though 
wealth had become more concentrated, ownership of modern corporations was widely 
dispersed leaving managers in control. The significance of this stemmed from the different 
interests of owners and managers. The law might be able to look after the rights of the 
property owner but it was not able to regulate the way managers ran the businesses under 
their control.
Arguing that existing theories were inadequate, Berle and Means called for a new 
concept of the corporation. Taking Adam Smith as representing traditional theory, they the 
separation of ownership from control had rendered it obsolete. Modern corporate enterprise 
was not the same as the forms of private enterprise with which Smith was familiar, and in the 
modern corporate world, involving cooperation and the exercise of “authority almost to the 
point of autocracy” within business, “individual liberty is necessarily curtailed” ( (Berle, & 
Means 1932), p. 349). The profit motive had become distorted and competition was no longer 
effective.
Today competition in markets dominated by a few great enterprises has come to be 
more often either cut-throat and destructive or so inactive as to make monopoly or 
duopoly conditions prevail. Competition between a small number of units  each 
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involving an organization so complex that costs have become indeterminate does not 
satisfy the condition assumed by earlier economists, nor does it appear likely to be as 
effective a regulator of industry and of profits as they had assumed. ( (Berle, & Means 
1932), p. 351)
These works are enough to show that, even during the prosperity of the 1920s, economists 
were questioning whether there might be structural reasons why markets could not be fully 
competitive and might fail to deliver the benefits they were supposed to bring. In the 1930s, 
such explanations were to become a prominent explanation of the depression.
3. The depression and market failure, the 1930s
When the world was hit by the Great Depression, many economists naturally turned to 
theories of the business cycle their for diagnoses of what had gone wrong. However, the 
downturn clearly indicated a failure of American capitalism and some economists argued that 
this failure amounted to a market failure: it was the result of a breakdown of competition—of 
a failure of competition to produce the results that, according to traditional theory, it should 
produce. In other words, they turned not to interactions between different parts of the 
economy but to the way individual markets functioned, drawing on ideas developed in the 
1920s and earlier. These two perspectives on the Great Depression can be seen in the 
programs of the AEA soon after the stock market crash of 1929. At the first session after the 
crash, a round-table discussion on the causes of the economic problem was titled, “The theory 
of dynamics as related to industrial instability” ( (Taussig et al 1930)). At the 1931 meeting, 
when it was becoming much clearer that it was no ordinary depression, the equivalent session 
12
comprised a diagnosis by Schumpeter ( (1931)), to which five economists responded 
( (Adams et al 1931)), producing a wide ranging discussion of possible causes of the cycle. 
However, at the same meeting, the causes of the depression were also addressed in a session 
in which eight economists discussed “The decline of laissez faire”  (Handman et al 1931). 
Though labelled “Economic history” and covering thinking several centuries, it appears to 
have been  motivated, at least in part, by current problems. The link between markets and 
depression is clearest in Alvin Hansen’s contribution (ibid., pp. 8-9), talking about the 
problems of price rigidity, especially for a country still on the gold standard, in a rapidly 
changing world. He argued that “social control” of business posed a dilemma, for whilst it 
might be possible to achieve greater stability than was available under free enterprise, the 
price would be slower technical advance and a more static market.
These two approaches can also be identified in the following year’s AEA meeting 
( (1932)). Hansen, Harry Jerome and Sumner Slichter introduced a discussion of the role of 
technological change in creating unemployment, a topic squarely in the tradition of American 
business cycle theory. Alongside that were sessions on “Private enterprise in economic 
history” and “Economic organization and the control of industry”. Though concerned with 
markets and market structures, this was as clearly addressed to the problem of depression as 
was the session on technological change. The first paper, by Henry Harriman, of the New 
England Power Company, argued that freedoms that might have been justified in the 
relatively simple society of the previous century could no longer be tolerated, for “the unwise 
action of one individual may adversely affect the lives of thousands” ( (Harriman 1932), p. 
67). His argument was that producers would be willing to “gauge their output to the 
consuming capacity of their country” but they were unable to do so because of the “ever-
present risk of incurring penalties under anti-trust laws which … are not in consonance with 
13
the present-day needs of industry” (ibid.). He suggested a scheme whereby businesses 
coordinate their actives so as to get away from “the present harsh and unremunerative 
competitive system” on condition that all such agreements were regulated by a government 
authority. This theme was taken up in the following paper in which Rexford Tugwell 
( (1932), p. 75), then one of Roosevelt’s advisers, argued that, because “War in industry is 
just as ruinous as war among nations”, there was a need for national planning. Such planning 
should be thought of as technical rather than political—as a “normal extension and 
development of the kind of planning which is a familiar feature of contemporary 
business” (ibid., p. 76).
Such arguments were reinforced by some of the measures Roosevelt introduced in his 
first term. In the face of falling prices and a collapse of business profits, the National 
Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of June 1933 suspended the anti-trust laws and supported 
measures to sustain prices. Companies were required to establish codes of fair competition, 
fixing prices and wages, establishing production quotas, and restricting entry. The NIRA was 
followed by the setting up of the National Recovery Administration (NRA) which helped 
draw up such codes of practice, with firms that participated being allowed to use a Blue Eagle 
emblem to indicate their compliance. The NRA came to an end in May 1935, when it was 
declared unconstitutional, initiating an ongoing conflict between Roosevelt and the Supreme 
Court.
Means extended the ideas he had developed with Berle in a series of articles in the mid 
1930s. The theoretical foundations for his work were presented in an article where he argued 
that it was necessary to bring economics together not with law (as in the collaboration with 
Berle) but with political science. The reason was that political science dealt with the 
14
organization of economic activity through administrative means. He claimed that by 1929, 
“the control of something approaching half of industrial activity had become an 
administrative matter handled within 200 great administrative units” ( (Means 1935a), p. 62). 
Markets were failing to restrain their power, which had been further increased in the 
depression. When such a high proportion of economic activity was organized outside the 
market-place, it did not make sense to rely solely on market coordination. Because 
economists had few tools for analyzing non-market organization, they should turn to political 
scientists for assistance.
Because the behavior of large corporations was unlike that of more traditional 
businesses, the market had “become rather a disorganizing than an organizing influence”, 
price being set by the administrative actions of large firms (ibid.). Prices were increasingly 
inflexible, this undermining the effectiveness of the market as a device for coordinating 
economic activities. “A Ford Company,” Means wrote, “can throw a whole countryside into 
depression by its single decision to alter radically the character of its output”. The system had 
become unstable through relying on the market to coordinate activities that were not 
organized through markets.
Means, now in the Department of Agriculture, applied these ideas to monetary policy, 
arguing that it was no longer appropriate to treat all prices as being flexible. He substantiated 
his claim that some prices were set administratively by using wholesale price data to classify 
items according the frequency with which their prices changed. This revealed large 
differences between commodities: there were 125 items that changed price almost every 
month and, at the other end of the scale, there were 95 that changed price less than five times 
in eight years ( (Means 1935b), p. 402). The former were the ones to which traditional theory 
applied; the latter were determined administratively. There was also a clear correlation, albeit 
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with wide dispersion, between the frequency of price changes and the fall in prices from 
1929-32. Prices that changed infrequently had fallen around 10%, whilst ones that changed 
often had fallen 50% (with wide dispersion about both of these figures ( (Means 1935b), p. 
404). There was also a connection with production, industries with inflexible prices seeing 
the largest falls in output.
The problem of excess capacity was tackled in a major project started in 1932 by the 
Brookings Institution. Directed by Edwin Nourse, the project’s first volume, America’s 
Capacity to Produce ( (Nourse et al 1934)) established, on the basis of industry-by-industry 
statistical analysis, that there was excess capacity of around 20 per cent. In the last in the 
series of four volumes arising from the project one of Nourse’s collaborators, Harold 
Moulton ( (1935)) concluded that by 1932 as much as 40 percent of capacity was unused. 
Harold Moulton, author of this volume, Income and Economic Progress, claimed that this 
failure was not the result of technical barriers on the production side but the failure of 
consumption to keep pace with productive capacity. The root cause of this lay in the fact that 
too much income was flowing to high income groups (who saved a high proportion of their 
income), leading to excessive saving. Saving was not translated into productive investment 
because the demand for investment was determined by consumption spending, which was not 
rising sufficiently fast, a very Hobsonian argument. The remedy was to be sought in making 
the distribution of income more equal. To achieve this, Moulton discussed employment in 
public enterprises, ideally self-financing but some financed by taxation, wage increases, 
profit sharing and price reductions. The last of these was thought particularly important:
16
There is one type of distributive reform which in our judgment outranks all the others 
in it promise of attaining the goal we seek. This is in the gradual but persistent 
revamping of price policy so as to pass on the benefits of technological progress and 
rising productivity to all the population in their role as consumers. … To seek the 
acceleration of economic progress by means of price reduction is not to attack the 
system of private capitalism but rather to return to the very logic upon which that 
system was justified and extolled by both lay and professional students of the 
economic process during the days when the system was assuming its present general 
character ( (Moulton 1935), pp. 161-2). 
To achieve economic progress it was necessary to do more than protect the interests of 
specific interests and groups: economic progress had to include “all our people, the unskilled 
laborer as well as the master of a trade, those seeking to develop a new business as well as 
those entrenched in an old one—the masses not the classes” (( (Moulton 1935), pp. 163).
Another powerful statement of the case that capitalism had to be reformed if it were to 
survive came from Henry Simons, at Chicago, whose “Positive program for laissez faire: 
some proposals for a liberal economic policy”, first published in 1934, ( (1948)) constituted a 
strong attack on monopoly. Rather than adopting the almost corporatist strategy of accepting 
monopoly as a fact of modern life and seeking to make large corporations operate in the 
public interest, he argued that competition needed to be restored. His approach was  explicitly 
libertarian in that he sought to defend liberty and democracy against their Communist and 
Fascist critics and against their real enemies, “the naive advocates of managed economy or 
national planning” (ibid., p. 41). The goal of economic policy should be to allow prices—
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central to the free-enterprise system—to be determined independently of government. Instead 
of tinkering with relative prices, thereby interfering with the efficient operation of the free-
enterprise system, governments should take positive actions to maintain competitive 
conditions in industry, for the problem facing society was monopoly.
[T]here is an intimate connection between freedom of enterprise and freedom of 
discussion and … political liberty can survive only within an effective competitive 
economic system. Thus, the great enemy of democracy is monopoly, in all its forms: 
gigantic corporations, trade associations and other agencies for price control, trade-
unions—or, in general, organization and concentration of power within functional 
classes. Effectively organized functional groups possess tremendous power for 
exploiting the community at large and even for sabotaging the system.  … If the 
organized economic economic groups were left to exercise their monopoly powers 
without political restraint, the result would be a usurpation of sovereignty by these 
groups—and, perhaps, a domination of the state by them. ( (Simons 1948), p. 44)
Given his mention of Communism and Fascism, such language suggests that he has in mind 
political developments in those parts of continental Europe where corporate interests became 
tied up with the state and the attack on democracy.
Simons therefore proposed a series of measures designed to eliminate monopoly—what 
he called “a complete ‘new deal’ with respect to the private corporation” (ibid, p. 58). These 
including reserving to the Federal government the power to license private corporations, 
prohibiting companies engaged in making or selling commodities or services from owning 
securities of any other such corporation, limiting the total property any one corporation could 
own, restricting the types of securities that could be issued, preventing inter-locking 
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directorships, and measures to reduce the waste of advertising (ibid., pp. 58-9, 71). Where 
monopolies were inevitable (utilities and railroads) they should be nationalized and run by 
the state.1
By adopting such a program, the state would effectively discharge is responsibilities to 
support a free-enterprise system. “The so-called failure of capitalism (or of the free-enterprise 
system, of competition),’ Simons claimed, “may reasonably be interpreted as primarily a 
failure of the political state in the discharge of its minimum responsibilities under 
capitalism” (ibid, p. 43). Markets could succeed only if the state ensured that competition 
prevailed, a task that required a radical reform.2
A similar attitude towards monopoly was found in Arthur E. Burns’s The Decline of 
Competition: A Study of the Evolution of American Industry ( (1936)), an exhaustive 600-
page historical study of competitive practices in the United States, clearly illustrates this way 
of thinking. In response to economists’ arguments about the benefits of competition, “read as 
beguiling briefs for laissez faire”, Burns argued, competitive capitalism had been given a 
thorough trial in the period stretching from the Civil War to the NIRA.3 However, despite 
attempts to give it legislative support, “capitalism failed to preserve its competitive 
quality” ( (Burns 1936), p. 1). The concentration of industry in the late nineteenth century 
through dramatic and ruthless method was widely blamed on the “pathological tendencies of 
1 Simons also advocated reforming the tax system, changing the nature of property 
rights so as to reduce the degree of inequality and a series of measures to reform the monetary 
system.
2 The substantial role Simons saw for the state no doubt explains why later Chicago 
economists, though they might see him as a predecessor, did not consider him a supporter of 
free markets.
3 Burns cites Alfred Marshall’s Industry and Trade ( (Marshall 1919)) as an example of 
the caveats economists made concerning laissez faire.
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a few individuals” and legislation was introduced to restrain such people ( (Burns 1936), p. 
2). The possibility that such practices were inherent in a competitive, individualistic system 
was ignored.  In the twentieth century attempts of the Supreme Court, “armed with the 
phrases ‘restraint of trade’ and ‘monopoly’” to compel “normal” competitive behavior proved 
ineffective. “Intent” to restrain trade was hard to establish and statistical measures, such as 
long periods of price stability, were inconclusive evidence. 
Drawing on Chamberlin ( (Chamberlin 1933)) and Robinson ( (Robinson 1933)), Burns 
argued that there was no clear distinction between monopoly and competition, and elements 
of monopoly were an increasingly important and inescapable part the economic system.
Elements of monopoly have always been interwoven with competition but the 
monopoly elements have increased in importance. They can no longer be regarded as 
occasional and relatively unimportant aberrations from competition. They are such an 
organic part of the industrial system that it is useless to hope that they can be removed 
by law and the industrial system thus be brought into conformity with the ideal of 
perfect competition. ( (Burns 1936), p. 3)
A major factor was a reduction in the number of sellers in many industries. Part of the 
problem was developments in technology making for large scale organization but 
concentration was also encouraged by the developments in corporate law highlighted by 
Berle and Means which favored corporations over individuals, and by patent laws. Anti-trust 
law had failed because, in outlawing certain practices, it had simply caused businesses to to 
suppress competition in ways not covered by the law. Burns reviewed many of these practices 
in detail: price discrimination, non-price competition and the integration of industrial 
operations.
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The extent to which Burns departed from mechanical views of the way markets 
worked, believing that there was significant indeterminacy in pricing policies, leaving room 
for the business psychology, is shown by his eventual conclusion. Very critical of the NIRA 
and NRA, he came down in favor of social control of business through the courts. “Reasoned 
decisions publicly available are the best means of providing for the evolution of an effective 
technique of control and for the minimization of resistance to policy” ( (Burns 1936), p. 590).
Though Moulton had sketched what needed to be done to ensure economic progress, 
none of the four volumes produced by the Brookings team proposed specific policies to 
achieve these goals. This was tackled three years later by Nourse and Horace Drury in 
Industrial Price Policies and Economic Progress ( (1938)). Taking up Moulton’s conclusion, 
they started from the premise that the best way to improve economic welfare was “though a 
consistent policy of expanding real incomes by lowering the prices of goods and services 
wherever advances in techniques and organization make such a course practicable” ( (Nourse, 
& Drury 1938), p. 2).  After reviewing the way prices were formed in a wide range of 
markets and in different businesses, they presented a detailed account of the history 
competition in the United States, supporting the conclusions reached by Berle, Means and 
Burns, whose books were cited approvingly, in many industries, competition no longer 
worked as it had done. In some industries, such as agriculture, prices were determined in the 
market, and there was no need for action. However, many industries were characterized by 
administered prices, determined not by the market but by the industrial executive. It was 
these prices that were the problem.
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The “administered prices” of the big corporation are expressions of the thinking of 
particular men who occupy executive positions. They reflect the way in which those 
individuals suppose that the economic process works. A big corporation is a potent 
instrument in the hands of a stupid man to carry into effect a price policy which may 
stunt its growth or lead to its actual death. It is, in the hands of one who understands 
the laws of economic growth, an equally powerful instrument for the carrying out of a 
price program which will stimulate and develop the market, lead to capacity 
operations, and thereby contribute to that general prosperity on which the given 
business will feed in the future. ( (Nourse, & Drury 1938), p. 270-1).
Though there might be a role for regulating prices, there was in Nourse’s conclusions an 
assumption that business behavior needed to be changed. Industrialists might bemoan the 
stupidity of labour union officials, yet they could be equally stupid in their pricing policies. 
The clear implication was that if industrialists could be persuaded that there were better 
policies, they would find it in their interests to adopt them. Businessmen benefited from free 
enterprise but in return they acquired obligations to society.
If the American business man demands the right of freedom of economic enterprise, 
society in granting it to him may properly ask that he use that freedom aggressively in 
the public interest. … If he cannot meet it [this challenge] the system of free 
enterprise under private capitalism is doomed to a condition of invalidism, low 
vitality, and unproductiveness. ( (Nourse, & Drury 1938), p. 275).
By the time Roosevelt wrote to Congress, there was thus an extensive literature arguing that 
stagnation and depression were the result of competition having broken down, implying the 
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need for policies that ran counter to the policies of maintaining prices that he had pursued in 
his first administration. The problem was not ruinous competition putting firms out of 
business but inadequate competition, resulting in households having insufficient incomes to 
buy the goods being produced.
4. The concentration of economic power
In response to the President’s letter, Congress established a Temporary National Economic 
Committee (TNEC), made up of members of both Senate and the House of Representatives, 
to investigate the concentration of economic power. Staff from various government agencies 
produced a series of monographs, and the TNEC heard evidence from many witnesses. One 
of the most widely discussed hearings was the one in which Lauchlin Currie and Alvin 
Hansen gave evidence (see  (Sandilands 1990), pp. 83-4;  (Stein 1969), pp. 167-8). Hansen 
was the first and in the morning of May 16, 1939, after explaining about flows of savings and 
investment, he argued that the depression had been brought about by a decline in investment 
that could be linked to population growth having been much lower in the 1930s than it had 
been in the 1920s. A fall in investment, and hence unemployment, could arise from a mere 
slowdown in the rate of expansion. His evidence was primarily statistical, full of technical 
details about how magnitudes were measured. 
Before Currie gave evidence in the afternoon, the committee chair, Senator Joseph 
O’Mahoney emphasized the importance of the topic by reading out a letter Roosevelt had 
sent that day, saying that he was concerned not only with idle men and factories but also with 
“the vast reservoir of money and savings [that had] remained idle in stagnant pools” ( (United 
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States, Temporary National Economic Committee 1940), pp. 3519, 4009). Roosevelt 
expressed his hope that the committee would analyze ways in which “the financial machine” 
could be made to work more efficiently. Currie’s evidence provided further statistics, 
focusing explicitly on “income-producing expenditures that offset saving”, material that was 
clearly directly related to Roosevelt’s concerns. Hansen was then recalled to interpret 
Currie’s statistics. His crucial point was that, in order to have full employment, all savings, 
even money that was hoarded, had to be offset by some form of spending.
Though such justification may not have been necessary, especially given Roosevelt’s 
letter, Hansen justified paying attention to saving and investment by arguing that it was 
wrong to focus exclusively on commodity markets:
Too frequently when the functioning of the price system is under consideration 
attention is focused almost exclusively upon the commodity markets.
To leave an inquiry into the functioning of the price system, with a consideration 
of commodity prices alone would in my judgment overlook a sector in our economy, 
which is more important than any other for an understanding of the operation, the 
maladjustments and the instability of modern economic life. I refer in particular to 
that area which relates to the flow of savings and to the flow of new investment into 
the expansion of productive equipment. ( (United States, Temporary National 
Economic Committee 1940), p. 3497)
He made no comments on the merits of the idea that there was a much more generalized 
market failure linked to a decline of competition, but merely drew the committee’s attention 
to the importance of what Roosevelt had called the financial machine. A later critic ( (Stigler 
1942), p. 5) pointed out that the TNEC had failed to hear any other opinions  on monetary 
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economics and that both Hansen and Currie completely ignored monopoly. Given his 
previous work, Berle might have been expected to address the problem in his testimony 
( (United States, Temporary National Economic Committee 1940), pp. 3809-3835) but he did 
not. He was called as an expert on corporate finance, and his evidence concerned the role of 
bank credit and corporate bond markets in influencing investment. His evidence on the 
concentration of corporate capital, and problems faced by small business-men in raising 
finance fitted well with the arguments with Means about the changing structure of industry, 
but with creating new financial institutions that might make the system run more efficiently.
Even if Hansen and Currie were the star witnesses ( (Stein 1969), p. 168), their 
testimony covered only 88 of the 33,000 pages published by the TNEC.4 Elsewhere, in both 
monographs produced by employees of the government agencies involved, some supervised 
by academic economists, and the record of the hearings, extensive attention was paid to 
problems of industrial structure and factors that might have caused competition to become 
ineffective. Monographs were devoted to the structure of industry, pricing policies (with a 
separate monograph on basing-point pricing), antitrust policy, patents, taxation, wages, 
profits income distribution, life insurance and the motion picture industry. Hearings covered 
patents, technology and the concentration of economic power, monopolistic practices, 
insurance, investment and profits, as well as specific industries.5 These were summarized in 
the TNEC’s final report ( (United States, Temporary National Economic Committee 1941a)).
4 There is an ambiguity in the number of volumes in that some volumes numbered 
separately were printed as single physical volumes. The page count is taken from  (Stigler 
1942), p. 1.
5 Neither of these lists is comprehensive. For a complete set of volumes, go to https://
archive.org/search.php?query=temporary%20national%20economic%20committee.
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The report began by documenting the extent of monopoly in the United States. After 
explaining some of the problems involved in defining monopoly, statistics were presented on 
the degree of concentration in different industries and there was a discussion of the practices 
by which firms sought to maintain their market positions. It concluded that concentration had 
increased over the previous fifty years and even in industries that were normally competitive, 
“competition is constantly breaking down” ( (United States, Temporary National Economic 
Committee 1941a), p. 26). However, it was not inevitable that this should happen: the report 
rejected the argument that the efficiency of large-scale production inevitably led to monopoly, 
which was the result of formal agreements, secret understandings, combinations, interlocking 
directorates and stock-holdings, restrictive practices, coercion, intimidation, violence and 
property rights that gave their owners exclusive privileges, patents and tariffs (ibid., p. 28).
After a chapter documenting the concentration of production, the report turned to 
“Managed industrial prices” (ibid., Chapter III). Though expressed in different language, this 
was Means’s argument about administered prices.
For the prices of a vast range of industrial commodities and even of some agricultural 
products are controlled to a material extent by the policy decisions of business 
executives acting individually or in concert. Unlike such products as wheat … the 
prices of such commodities as steel, aluminum, automobiles, cigarettes, and bread are 
all subject to a substantial degree of control by a limited number of executives in a 
few large companies. ( (United States, Temporary National Economic Committee 
1941a), p. 67)
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Such businessmen all faced constraints on their ability to set prices, but they were continually 
trying to widen the limits within which they had discretion over prices. The result was that 
the businessman had become “the economic planner of our society”.
Attention was also paid to technological change. Economic theory held that increased 
in productivity would lower prices, increasing the consumer’s purchasing power. However, 
“this theory presupposes that all prices are ‘market’ prices” ( (United States, Temporary 
National Economic Committee 1941a), p. 118). But in many industries, where prices were 
“influenced” (there was no settled terminology for this phenomenon) businesses were able to 
retain some of these gains. Prices remained high and employment fell fastest in these 
industries. Technological advance thus created gains and losses. Anticipating later chapters, a 
summary of these losses was immediately followed by the observation that “Evidence of the 
lack of balance between investment and consumption necessary for the maintenance of a 
‘balanced economy’ is unmistakable” ( (United States, Temporary National Economic 
Committee 1941a), p. 141).
The way in which the report made the transition to discussion of saving and investment 
was through moving from the analysis of the concentration of production to “Concentration 
of ownership of corporate assets, earnings and profits” and concentration of ownership of 
wealth in general. This led to an analysis of the concentration of savings (in a chapter written 
by Oscar Altman) which began, quoting from Currie’s testimony, by explaining that what 
mattered was not whether savings were invested or consumed, but whether they were 
hoarded and not returned to the income stream. Hydraulic metaphors abounded, as when the 
chapter talked of the “reservoirs” in which savings were collected (ibid., p. 214). The capital 
market was the name used to refer to the set of institutions that transferred funds from savers, 
increasingly concentrated, into the hands of investors.
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When it turned to the concentration of investment, another chapter written by Altman, 
the report pointed to two functions performed by investment. Not only did investment 
investment increase productive capacity but also it maintained the flow of purchasing power. 
This was illustrated with a diagram taken from a TNEC monograph by Martin Taitel 
( (United States, Temporary National Economic Committee 1941a), p.  225; (United States, 
Temporary National Economic Committee, & Taitel 1941), p. 128), shown here as Figure 1. 
Though its circularity is only implicit, this is virtually a circular flow diagram, for it shows 
how national income in one period generates national income in the next. However, where 
post-war circular flow diagrams were to focus on the flow of income, with the capital market 
being considered as a side-channel, here the “capital pool” was central, with the relationship 
between the stock of capital and flows of saving and investment being analyzed in great 
detail.
Altman’s statistics showed that an over the previous two decades, the fraction of 
investment funded by business saving—by companies’ internally generated funds—had 
increased dramatically, and he argued that this was an underestimate of the true figure. This 
gave scope for the issues raised by Berle and Means about the separation of ownership and 
control to be important.
When businesses invest their own funds it must not be assumed that the actual savers 
are identical with those who make the investment decisions. … it is the managers who 
decide how much should be set aside for reserves and expansion. … In theory the 
stockholders have the right to determine whether investment of the earnings of the 
property should be made at all, and how much. Actually, in most cases, they play no 
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effective part in the decisions. ( (United States, Temporary National Economic 
Committee 1941a), p. 231)
For market mechanisms to work, investment would have to respond to profit rates, but there 
was evidence that this did not happen. Though he conceded that little was known about the 
extent to which “social, personal and political elements” determined investment decisions, 
there was evidence that “High rates of profit do not of themselves attract new investment, nor 
low rates deter it” ( (United States, Temporary National Economic Committee 1941a), p. 
246). The most important factors affecting new investment were the level of output and the 
need to introduce new technologies. 
The depression, Altman concluded, had arisen because concentration of income and 
wealth had raised the level of saving, and hence the need for investment. At the same time, 
concentration of wealth reduced the outlets for investment: “concentration limits the extent to 
which capital expenditures can or will be made for capital goods to take business away from 
existing facilities” (ibid, p. 247). It is the last phrase that is crucial here, for it is the result of a 
decline in competition.
This set the stage for chapter arguing for policies to stimulate investment, written by 
Paul Sweezy, strongly influenced by Hansen, whose testimony was quoted at length at the 
outset. There was some evidence that investment might be insensitive to interest rates, but 
this did not apply to all sectors of the economy. Housing and small business investment were 
responsive to interest rate cuts, so measures should be taken to focus on them. For much of 
industry, however, monopoly was a barrier in that monopolies would be reluctant to 
undertake new investment till older investments had worn out. “In short,” Sweezy wrote, 
“under monopoly new methods tend to succeed old methods; under competition, new 
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methods tend to replace old methods” ( (United States, Temporary National Economic 
Committee 1941a), p. 278). The report therefore concluded with chapters covering housing, 
small businesses and consumers in more detail, and a closing chapter on fiscal policy.
Figure 1: Selected Features of the Flow of Funds
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Source:  (United States, Temporary National Economic Committee, & Taitel 1941), p. 128.
5. The legacy
When investigating the economic thinking spawned by the Great Depression, historians have 
generally focused on the constellation of events generally known as “The Keynesian 
Revolution” and the emergence of ways of thinking about “macroeconomic” problems. 
According to Keynes, there was a very specific market failure: a market economy had no 
mechanism to ensure that sufficient investment would be undertaken to absorb the savings 
that would be generated at full employment. His aim was to argue that, despite the existence 
of mass unemployment, the key market failure was in the capital market, not the labor 
market. For over three decades this was the framework within which the causes of 
depressions were debated: was wage rigidity necessary for involuntary unemployment to 
occur, or was there some other reason why free-market economies would typically fail to 
achieve full employment?
This paper adds a very important element to the conventional story of the Keynesian 
revolution. Many American economists sought to explain the Great Depression as a failure of 
competition. Though they were not “Keynesians”, they hardly fit Keynes’s stereotype of a 
“classical” economist, using arguments about how concentration of market power could 
interfere with market processes and produce inequalities of wealth that would, in a 
Hobsonian manner, reduce aggregate spending.  The catastrophic failure of the market system 
was due, at least in significant part, to the growth of monopoly, which prevented traditional 
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market mechanisms from working. Though the phrase was not used at the time, the nearest 
being the term “Failure of capitalism”, cited by Simons, this amounted to an argument that 
there had been a general market failure. Markets worked when there was effective 
competition but competition was not working, not because individual businessmen were 
crooks, but because  of deeply rooted structural factors. Wage rigidity was a part of this story 
but only a small part.
The proceedings of the TNEC are particularly important because these two perspectives 
on the depression—that it was the result of a failure of the financial machine to translate 
savings into investment, and that depression was the result of a widespread breakdown in 
competition—came together in their hearings. Historians who have considered this episode 
have focused on the way Hansen and Currie captured the attention of the committee. 
However, whilst that is correct, simply focusing on a clash between “Keynesian” and older 
views obscures the way in which a new form of what, for want of a better term might be 
called “American Keynesianism” arose out of the literature that associated market failure 
with the breakdown of competition. Hansen, whose arguments are particularly influential, 
was deeply rooted in the “institutionalist” traditions out of which the literature on the decline 
of competition emerged, his Keynesianism being deeply influenced by structural factors, such 
as the decline in population growth and changes in the flow of innovations, both factors that 
entered arguments about the growth of monopoly.
Even more significant, the report of the TNEC presented arguments for fiscal policy as 
a response to the problems caused by the concentration of economic power. Concentration of 
wealth affected saving and concentration of power within industry affected investment, and 
arguments about ownership and control provided a foundation distinctive basis for the 
Keynesian stress on the distinction between saving and investment. Keynesianism had been 
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encompassed into a worldview that owed more to American institutionalism than to 
Marshall’s Cambridge.
It is easy to trace the links between the literature discussed here and post-war industrial 
economics. Edward Mason, who along with Joe Bain, was one of the leading figures in what 
became known as the “Harvard” school of industrial economics had helped supervise the 
monograph on the central topic of “Price behavior and business policy”  (United States, 
Temporary National Economic Committee 1941b), as well as acting as a consultant on 
another volume. The TNEC’s quantitative approach, based on classifying industries, finds a 
clear echo in the work of Mason, Bain and their colleagues. Stigler’s ( (Stigler 1942)) 
questioning of the TNEC’s conclusions about the the extent and implications of monopoly 
represents an early statement of the “Chicago” view of monopoly. As this literature 
developed, it lost its connections with the business cycle and the attempt to explain the Great 
Depression in terms of a failure of competition. At the same time, explanations of depression 
were increasingly seen in Keynesian terms. As Rutherford has shown, institutionalists 
increasingly adopted Keynes.
However, the perspectives discussed in this paper did leave a mark on American 
Keynesianism as it developed after the Second World War. Accounts of the history of 
macroeconomics often focus on what Merhling ( (Mehrling 1997)) has called “monetary 
Walrasianism”, a term that accurately describes mathematical modeling in the tradition of 
John Hicks, Oskar Lange, Franco Modigliani and Don Patinkin in which macroeconomics is 
grounded on theories of competitive markets. It is well known that much work did not fit this 
framework, being less formal, and often based on the assumption that firms were imperfectly 
competitive, facing costs that were roughly constant up to full capacity. What is not often 
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acknowledged is that this approach was rooted in the analysis of markets discussed in this 
paper. It is no coincidence that some of the most influential interpreters of Keynes in the early 
1950s were not monetary Walrasians but had institutionalist roots: for example, Dudley 
Dillard’s The Economics of John Maynard Keynes: The Theory of a Monetary Economy 
(1948) and Hansen’s A Guide to Keynes ( (Hansen 1953)). John Kenneth Galbraith, a very 
influential Keynesian on account of his public profile, went so far as to develop, in a series of 
highly popular books, theories of market failure that clearly owed much to institutionalist 
theories of market failure developed during the 1930s (see  (Parker 2005)).
The debates discussed in this paper also left their mark on the work of Paul Samuelson, 
whose widely used textbook, Economics: An Introductory Analysis ( (Samuelson 1948)), did 
much to define postwar American Keynesiansism. Samuelson was personally and 
intellectually very close to Hansen during the decade after Hansen’s testimony to the TNEC. 
He was recruited by Hansen to act as a consultant to the National Resources Planning Board, 
working with Altman, author of two of the crucial chapters in the final report and testified 
several times before the committee, making proposals that were taken up in several 
monographs. The project on which Samuelson worked—using statistics on the distribution of 
income to obtain forecasts of postwar consumption—was entirely in the spirit of the TNEC’s 
analysis of concentration. He had Harvard teachers (e.g. Mason), fellow students (e.g. 
Sweezy), and MIT colleagues (e.g. Douglass Brown and Charles Myers), who were heavily 
involved in the TNEC’s deliberations. Much of this affected his thinking on macroeconomics 
and carried over into his textbook.
The TNEC was only cited three times in his textbook, once on the structure of 
American industry, once on industrial insurance schemes, and once to criticize the mistaken 
belief of those testifying to it that the US economy was entering a period of stagnation. 
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However its influence is pervasive. His discussion of business organization and the modern 
corporation documented industrial concentration under the heading “The evil of 
monopoly” ( (Samuelson 1948), pp. 126-7). He acknowledged that business was controlled 
by managers, not by its owners and he saw managers as having sufficient monopoly power to 
have some discretion in setting prices. Imperfect competition was more than a theoretical 
possibility. After discussing competitive markets, he wrote,
The practical importance of pure competition is not great enough to justify its further 
discussion. The competitive firm need only look at the newspaper price quotations of 
the Board of Trade to know all there is to know about price, demand, and revenue. … 
Realistically speaking, we must recognize that modern business firms—even the 
largest—are unable to calculate their marginal revenue and marginal cost. They 
cannot determine their optimum price and output with nice exactitude. … There 
seems nothing to do about this unsatisfactory situation but to try to specify a number 
of different competitive and monopolistic patterns characteristic of various important 
industrial situations. ( (Samuelson 1948)), pp. 509, 510, 511).
His first such category “Chronically overcrowded sick industries” carries stronger overtones 
of institutionalist industrial economics than the economic theory found in the mathematical 
models of markets in his Foundations of Economic Analysis ( (Samuelson 1947)).
Samuelson’s account of the determinants of saving and investment are too brief to be 
sure how far he accepted Altman’s and Taitel’s analysis but he did cite large corporations 
when explaining that saving and investment were undertaken by different people and for 
different reasons ( (Samuelson 1948), p. 254). His emphasis on the investment opportunities 
provided by new products, new resources and greater population clearly echoed Hansen and, 
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though he discussed the determination of interest rates, there was no systematic account of 
the effect of interest rates on investment: he allowed for the possibility that investment might 
vary with the level of national income but not that it might vary with the rate of interest.
Were these merely remarks in an introductory textbook, they might have little 
significance, despite Samuelson’s pre-eminence. Their significance arises because such a 
position was standard outside the world of mathematical economics. In the 1960s, it was 
routine to assume that constant costs, another regularity established in the pre-war literature 
and mark-up pricing ( (Samuelson 1948)), p. 509) to argue that prices would be largely 
independent of output. Arguments about “cost-push” inflation, which were widespread in the 
1950s and 1960s, were based on the assumption that prices were determined substantially 
independently of output, an assumption that made sense in a world where corporations had 
sufficient monopoly power to have discretion over the prices they set (see {Forder 2014}; 
(Backhouse, & Forder 2013)). Though consistent in its own terms, it was a view of the world 
that later generations of economists, committed to mathematical modeling of rational 
individuals, failed to understand.6
6. Concluding remarks
6 A good example of this is the notion of cost-push inflation. This was based on the 
assumption that supply and demand did not completely determine prices, with the result that 
there were limits within which non-economic, possibly sociological, factors could influence 
inflation, independently of the level of aggregate demand. As macroeconomics changed in the 
1970s, this view changed into one in which cost-push was no more than a label for changes 
originating on the supply side. The cost-push/demand-pull distinction had lost its rationale, 
but survived.
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Though they used different language, the Great Depression was, for most economists of the 
time, a clear example of market failure. For much of the 1930s, many American economists 
argued that the growth of market power had led to a failure of competition and that this had 
caused capitalism to fail. At the end of the decade, such explanations of the depression were 
displaced by theories about the failure of what Roosevelt called “the financial machine” to 
translate savings into investment. The interplay of these two conceptions of market failure 
can be seen in the proceedings of the TNEC, and this shows that, although the Keynesian 
perspective came to dominate the TNEC’s final report, it was merged with and presented as 
an extension of the view that the root cause of the problem was the concentration of 
economic power. The failure of the financial machine came to be seen as an extension of the 
more general view of market failure that had been widespread in the 1930s but which, by the 
1950s had dropped out of fashion, certainly among mathematical economists. 
The adoption of Keynesian ideas by its supporters contributed to the rapid decline of 
the institutionalist movement during the 1940s. However, ideas about market did feed into 
subsequent developments in economic analysis. In the 1940s and 1950s, discussions of the 
failure of competition were generally linked to microeconomics—to the failure of specific 
industries to perform well. The postwar debate between the “Harvard” and “Chicago” schools 
of industrial organization can be traced back at least to Stigler’s critique of institutionalist 
analysis found in the TNEC reports. Post war Keynesians focused not on market power but 
on deficient effective demand and the cause of depression, modeling this using the multiplier, 
the 45-degree line diagram popularized by Samuelson’s textbook, and what came to be 
known as the Hicks-Hansen IS-LM model. However, the background of many leading 
Keynesians in the arguments about market power prevalent in the 1930s left their mark on the 
way these models were interpreted. They were seen not as grounded in theories of perfectly 
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competitive equilibrium but as resting on ideas about the operation of imperfectly 
competitive markets that were not analyzed formally.
An important part of the story of the Keynesian revolution in America involves the 
taking up by institutionalists of Keynesian ideas, leading to the demise of institutionalism as a 
distinctive movement. In Hansen’s case this involved realizing that Keynes was proposing 
arguments that could be related to his own theory of stagnation, and that the multiplier could 
be incorporated into his own theoretical framework. In the proceedings of the TNEC, a 
similar process took place, in which ideas about the failure of the saving investment 
mechanism were incorporated into a more general theory of market failure, which they then 
dominated. This is not a complete account of the Keynesian revolution in America, which 
also involves a turn towards fiscal policy as the main weapon with which to combat 
unemployment but it is an important part of the story.
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